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Early on the morning of 16th May 1958 in Sekhukhuneland 82-year-
old Kgobolala Sekhukhune was roused from his sleep by a knock
at the door of his hut. In the pitch dark he responded. As the
door swung open he was stabbed in the chest with a spear and
hacked in the arm with an axe. Within three days nine men had
been killed, many more had been grievously wounded and plumes of
smoke from burning buildings and vehicles drifted into the pale
winter skies. As convoys of police churned up complementary
clouds of dust, men from the villages in the plains and the
valleys scrambled up the steep slopes of the Leolu Mts to seek
refuge - once again - in the caves and crevasses of this great
natural fortress.(1)
The initial explanations for these events offered by officials
and reporters invoked history and terror in equal measure. A
special correspondent for the Rand Daily Mail wrote, 'The Bapedi,
tribesmen who were the once all powerful rulers of Sekukuniland,
took up arms again last week for the first time in sixty years.
They have reverted to guerrilla-type tactics in an attempt to
regain their lost power and past glory....[Now] behind the brown
clouds [of dust] in caves among the rocks the dreaded 'babolai'
[murderers] wait.(2)
Increasingly, however, a sinister, secret organisation called the
Khudhuthamaga (red and white Tortoise) was presented as the
instigator and perpetrator of gruesome violence. The tone of
these interpretations owed a good deal to the fears of black
conspiracy and atavistic revolt which flourished within colonial
society in the aftermath of the Mau Mau Revolt. But the police
and prosecutors were able to assemble evidence which, although
fragmentary and even fanciful, suggested that the Khudhuthamaga
did exist and was centrally involved in the rising.(3)
This paper attempts a rather more substantial reconstruction of
the history of the Khudhuthamaga. It shows how its emergence in
the mid 1950s was shaped by an interaction of migrant and chiefly
political forms and discourses, and represented an attempt to
reconstruct the institution of chieftainship from below, in order
to prevent it from being incorporated into the Bantu Authority
system. A core component in this initiative was the attempt to
give new substance to the idea that kgoshl ke kgoshi ka batho (a
chief is a chief by the people). The Khudhuthamaga also wrestled
with the issue of how to deal with those individuals who were
perceived to favour Bantu Authorities and the paper traces how
and why its members edged towards the conclusion that they
should be killed. Both processes highlight key elements within
popular political culture.
This paper also extends the critique of literature which sees
rural revolts as essentially parochial affairs remote from
national political movements. In previous articles I have shown
that both the ANC and the SACP played an important if highly
mediated role in rural political mobilisation in the
Transvaal.(4) In this paper I argue that the experience of the
Sekhukhuneland Revolt contributed in turn to the wider debate
about the use of violence within the ANC and SACP which culminat-
ed in the launch of Umkhonto we Sizwe in 1961.
Migrants, Chiefs and Commoners
The conquest of the Pedi kingdom in 1879 brought with it predict-
able consequences of land alienation and political fragmentation.
A number of groups which had assisted the victorious armies were
recognised as independent chiefdoms. The heartland of the polity
was divided between the Lydenburg and Middleburg districts and
transformed into farms. Three locations were defined in the
remaining area of which the largest was the Geluks Location - a
narrow band of land hugging the foothills of the Leolu Mts. The
first Native Commissioner in the area Abel Erasmus pursued
policies of divide and rule with characteristic vigour. In 1896
he split Geluks location in half, relocated the Paramount to
Mohlaletse in the arid north, and installed a client, Kgolane, as
chief in the relatively populous and fertile southern portion.(5)
Well into the twentieth century the basic assumption of the
administration of the area was that the power of the chiefs and
especially that of the Paramount should be kept in check. While
the Paramountcy was thus formally restricted to authority over
no more than a portion of one location, in practice its authority
had considerably wider range. The hostility with which the Para-
mountcy was regarded by colonial authority also helped to ensure
that it retained widespread popular legitimacy amongst communi-
ties living on farms and in locations far beyond the formal
boundaries of its domain. From the 1920s, the imposition of 'tr-
ibal' land levies also allowed the Paramountcy to accumulate
substantial amounts of land. As the Native Affairs Department
(NAD) policy shifted towards a policy of retribalisation, chiefs
in Sekhukhuneland as elsewhere, were given somewhat greater
recognition and material reward. But the position of the Para-
mount remained restricted and unresolved. And this ambiguous
context encouraged some headmen to harbour the ambition to
elevate their own positions.(6)
At the apex of the local political system which was constructed
in the first three decades of the twentieth century were two
Native Commissioners - one based in Pokwani location and the
other in Geluks location. In theory these men held sway over a
vast area and population. Chiefs who proved recalcitrant ran the
risk of a reduction in their stipends while those who challenged
official authority directly ran a very real risk of deposition.
Commoners who stepped out of line were also firmly dealt with
deportation being a common punishment. In practice, however, the
Commissioners had very limited impact on the day to day existence
of most of their subjects. Their primary responsibilities were to
collect taxes and to issue passes to work seekers and these
activities engrossed both their energies and those of the handful
of staff they had at their disposal. Aside from the annual tax
tour (which was discontinued in the 1920s) when the Commissioner
and his retinue made a grand progress round the district, the
main contact many individuals had with these officials was when
they left en route to town. The vast bulk of the practical admin-
istration of the area, including the allocation of land, the
adjudication of cases, and the sanctioning of crucial phases in
the political, social, economic and religious cycle of communi-
ties, was handled by scores of unrecognised sub-chiefs or head-
man (dikgoshana) who administered the villages dotted across the
area. The authority of this level of leadership was sanctioned
and conferred not by the Native Commissioner but by the Paramount
or in a minority of cases by one of the other powerful chiefs.
Only the most intractable issues were referred from these head-
men to the Paramountcy for resolution as most communities
shunned the Native Commissioners court and offices as far as
possible.(7)
This political system was predicated on a system of migrant
labour which involved virtually all males from their teenage
years, for expanding periods of their lives, as the decades and
the generations slipped by. Vet despite the centrality of migran-
cy to the lives of these men, most still regarded it as a way of
preserving a primarily rural way of life. Migrancy was a means to
secure the resources to marry, to build a homestead, to accumu-
late cattle and ultimately to retire. Towns were regarded as
Hakgoweng - the place of the whites - or.Leshokeng - a wilder-
ness. Part of what defined them as such was the absence of core
institutions like initiation and chieftainship and what they saw
as the corrosion of appropriate relationships of gender and
generation. They believed in sum that towns were deeply uncivi-
lised places. The Paramountcy was for many a key symbol and
guarantor of a cherished rurally focussed moral order, while the
Native Commissioner represented an outpost of Hakgoweng best kept
in quarantine.(8)
The committment to an alternative rural world was in part sus-
tained by most raens' expectation that they would ultimately
secure some rights to land and livestock. This did not of course
imply an egalitarian rural society. Evidence from the 1930s and
1940s suggests that there were very marked disparities in the
resources which households commanded and new settlers could
battle to gain access to any land, especially in the increasing-
ly congested locations. The residents of Sekhukhuneland faced the
looming threat to their social order of the creation of a perma-
nently landless and stockless stratum. This spectre was for the
moment held at bay by complex social networks and processes of
redefinition of rights in land and cattle which prevented the
creation of starkly defined rural classes. Equally important was
the steady haemorrhage of men to the towns on a permanent basis
which acted as a pressure valve and in some instances allowed
for the redistribution of resources. But just how long this
elaborate balancing act could be maintained was open to
question.(9)
Socio-economic factors were of course only one of a number of
forms of differentiation within the villages of Sekhukhuneland.
The population of each chiefdom was - for example - divided into
a number of distinct ranked strata ranging from bakgomana -
royals - through batho feela - commoners - to mathupya - de-
scendants of captives. But probably the most profound division in
most . villages in the 1930s and 1940s was between the baditshaba
(those of the community) - and the Bakristi (a small Christian
minority). Christians in most instances lived in a distinct area
of the village. John Phala an ANC activist recalled of his child-
hood in the 1930s: 'We can see that Apartheid started there among
the black people. There was a contradiction between us, the Maja-
kane(Christians) and those they called the Baheitene(heathens)'.
It is revealing that the term Majakane was derived from the
verb jaka meaning 'to live in a foreign country.' Christianity
was closely associated in the minds of most Pedi with colonial
conquest and a broader assault on established values and social
practices. Christians were seen as having turned their backs on
the community (setshaba). Christian youth did not not attend
initiation and as a result they were not incorporated into
regimental structures. Uninitiated men were also excluded from
the central political forums in the villages. Christian youths
until the 1950s, however, constituted the overwhelming majority
of those who attended the predominantly mission schools in the
area. When mocked for still being 'boys' by initiated youths
converts responded with derision at their detractors 'backward-
ness' and lack of 'civilization.' Onsuprisingly these exchanges
became heated and sometimes violent, although it was unusual for
serious injury to be the result of these confrontations.(10)
Tensions between commoners and chiefs also flared from time to
time in many communities. These conflicts were most marked in
those cases - such as that of Abel Erasmus' client Kgolane - in
which chieftainship was blatantly the creation of colonial manip-
ulation. In these instances commoners fought a long drawn-out
struggle to reduce the effective authority of the chief to the
mininum possible, without invoking reprisals from white official-
dom and, whenever they were able, to invoke the alternative
authority of the Paramountcy.(11) But even in communities were
the legitimacy of the chief was more securely grounded the
nature of chiefly power was a point of ongoing contestation. The
scarcity of resources meant that commoners were increasingly
unable to employ the classic strategy of withdrawing from the
areas of incompetent and/or capricious chiefs, and chiefs could
now look to white officials to confirm and maintain them in
office in the face of challenge. The overall result was to make
Chiefs more authoritarian and remote from their subjects. Godfrey
Pitje who grew up in Sekhukhuneland and who returned to conduct
anthropological research in the 1940s, observed that whereas in
the past commoners had been able to speak in pitso (public meet-
ings)
Nowdays ... there is very little freedom of speech . Pedi
chiefs are notorious for resenting remarks from commoners. After
a commoner has aired his views it is not uncommon for the chief
to ask "Whose son is he? "... It is a reflection of the mentali-
ty common amongst nobles... that those lower than themselves are
not capable of advising them Those who resent such treat-
ment usually do so by reminding the chief that Kqoshi ke kqoshi
ka batho(ie a chief is a chief by the grace of his people). This
expression carries with it the threat that unless the chief rules
by the will of the majority, his subjects may desert him. Howev-
er, under European administration this threat cannot be carried
out, at least not in the old sense.'(12)
One recurring source of conflict was the imposition of special-
levies by the chiefs. The most controversial of these charges
was a land levy of LI per tax payer which was initiated in 1923
and partly administered by the Native Commissioner . As we have
seen above this considerably expanded the amount of land under
the authority of the Paramount . But it was far from univer-
sally supported. The payment of the levy ran counter to the
longstanding popular conviction that 'the land belongs to us , we
cannot buy our own ground.' (13) There was a deep-seated reluc-
tance to buy back land that most people believed had been stolen
by the whites. The land that was acquired was also often remote
from the locations, already densely settled and did little to
alleviate land hunger in the heart of Sekhukhuneland. Some
headmen and subordinate chiefs also chafed against a system
which expanded the power of the Paramount but did little to
enhance their own positions. Special collectors were appointed to
gather the levy from groups of migrants on the reef and periodic
raids were also conducted by the Native Commissioners' police in
the reserves. Defaulters were sometimes manhandled and found
themselves fined or even imprisoned. Conflict on this issue
flared on a number of occassions from the 1930s onwards. The levy
was finally discontinued in the early 1950s in part as a result
of a campaign led by ex-servicemen which featured amongst other
things a protest march to Mohlaletse - the seat of the Paramount-
cy.(14)
Communities in Sekhukhuneland in the 1930s and 1940s were neither
egalitarian nor in equilibrium, but were rather in the grip of
deepseated processes of change and were shot through with divi-
sions and tensions, only some of which have been hinted at
above. Nonetheless the evidence for this period suggests that
the most profound cleavage lay not within chiefdoms but between
this world to some extent defined by the exercise of communal
tenure and chiefly authority, and the wider world of white power
and capitalist relationships. Sekhukhuneland and especially the
locations within it were seen1by many who lived there as a place
of refuge. It was a sanctuary from swaggering white officials and
employers, from brutal policemen and the burden of passes, from
wage labour and rents, from dangerous women, delinquent youth and
the rampant criminality which infested urban society. The limited
degree of freedom which this represented was closely tied to
retaining access to land and livestock, to preserving the remain-
ing autonomy of the chiefdoms, and to ensuring that the power of
white officialdom remained as confined as possible. Native Com-
missioners were humoured as long as they did not attempt to
tamper with the inner workings of the chiefdoms and most were
aware in the 1930s and 40s that minimal intervention brought
maximum co-operation. Basil Sansom who conducted fieldwork in
the area two decades later commented 'Any alteration that en-
tails, or seems to entail, further penetration of white influence
into what the Pedi define as their sphere of command will encoun-
ter principled rejection'.(15)
Betterment and Bantu Authorities
In the aftermath of the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act there was
intensifying state intervention in the countryside. In particular
in the northern Transvaal vast tracts of land - including, farms
bordering on the old locations in Sekhukhuneland - were acquired
by the South African Native Trust(SANT).From the 1940s these
farms were automatically designated 'Betterment' areas and
strict controls were imposed on the inhabitants. In the name of
'conservation' cattle were culled, lands were demarcated and
fenced, individual land and stock holdings were reduced and in
some instances a landless class was defined. Communities found
themselves hemmed in by a host of restrictions, ranging from a
ban on cutting trees to prohibitions on keeping donkeys and
goats. Households found that they had to pay fees for grazing
stock and rents for residential sites. 'Widows' were informed
that they were entitled to reduced amounts of arable land. New
settlements were laid out in straight lines. Individuals who had
- or sought to secure - land and livestock to sustain house-
holds in the present or to keep alive the ambition of rural
retirement in the future were placed in jeopardy. But perhaps
most ominous of all were the powers that ' Betterment' and its
post-war successor 'Rehabilitation' gave to white officials and
their agents to interfere in the daily life of communities.
Native Commissioners, Agricultural Officers and (African) Agri-
cultural Rangers invaded communities with rolls of fencing wire,
sheaves of rules and regulations and lists of new charges. Chiefs
and headmen who resided on land under control of the SANT found
themselves functionaries in a tightly defined administrative
system. This complex of measures became popularly known as 'the
Trust'. It was widely detested as intrusive, oppressive and
inimical to the maintenance of even a residual political and
economic autonomy.(16) Johannes Mangope Phala, for example, gives
a vivid sense of the violation of a private doamain in explaining
why he rejected 'the Trust'.
They were coming into our homes,... even our own homes would
be controlled by them.... Can you accept that if you marry a
women that another man just comes, throws you out of your house,
climbs into your bed and sleeps in your blankets?(17)
'The Trust' met with intense opposition in the Northern and East-
ern Transvaal and conflicts flared throughout the 1940s.
The Nationalist Party victory of 1948 and the Bantu Authorities
Act of 1951 ushered in a new phase of rural restructuring. But
while the system of tribal authorities was seen as the foundation
of a decisively separate administrative order for Africans, it
was also seen as a new solution to old problems. Officials in
Pretoria and on the ground believed that Bantu Authorities would
hasten the implementation of 'Rehabilitation'. Communities -
especially in the old locations - also believed that a double
agenda existed. While officials harped on benefits of 'self-
rule' , their audiences interpreted their blandishments as a
poison chalice enticing them with the nectar of 'independence'
but brimming with the venom of 'the Trust'.(18)
By 1952 the Secretary of Native Affairs Dr W. Eiselen - who had
grown up on a mission station in Sekhukhuneland - was anxious
that the process of establishing Bantu Authorities(BAs) should
get under way. Confronted by widespread popular hostility to BAs,
but concerned to avoid undermining the legitimacy of the system
by the use of blatant coercion, officials looked for the opportu-
nity for a breakthrough. The prestige and legitimacy of the Pedi
Paramountcy which officials had long viewed with suspicion, now
held out the possibility of dramatic 'progress'. They noted that
the influence of the Maroteng chiefly house stretches far
beyond the present tribal area... [in] the nineteenth century
they were the recognised rulers of the Bantu who presently live
in the .... area between Bosbokrand in the East , Pietersburg in
the West and Pretoria in the South. (19)
Eiselen and his officials believed that, if the Paramount could
be persuaded to accept the BA system, communities in the broader
region rapidly would follow suit.
The scope for manipulation of the Paramountcy was also increased
by a prolonged partial interregnum. In 194 3 Sekhukhune II died
after a long reign. His designated heir Thulare Sekhukhune had
however pre-deceased him in 1941 without producing ah heir and
the Maroteng bakgomana (royals) faced the problem of how to
establish a legitimate heir. The immediate solution was to in-
stall Thulare's younger brother Morwamotshe as acting chief with
the responsibility of raising an heir for his brother. Morwa-
motshe was a mild man of limited education. He was reluctant to
take, a clear lead on any issue and was content to delegate
decisions to his councillors. The consequence was that the af-
fairs of the chiefdom were increasingly dominated by his more
assertive brothers. The most senior was the tribal secretary
Motodi Sekhukhune but the most influential, and a man who later
was viewed by many as the effective ruler at Mohlaletse, was
Mabowe James Sekhukhune.(20)
Mabowe was remote from the main line of succession but was a
personable youth with a quick intelligence who enjoyed a warm
relationship with his father Sekhukhune II. At the latters'
suggestion he left the local school and went to stay with a
lawyer 'Aapie' Roux at Lydenburg who had done work on behalf of
the Paramount. Mabowe attended to local mission school where he
completed std six. During his stay in the Roux household he also
became well versed in the ways of the Afrikaner middle class. In
1936 he went to the Rand and, after a brief spell as a mine
clerk, found employment in the concession store at the Van Ryn
Deep Mine where he worked for four years and mastered a range of
the skills needed in commerce. In the 1940s, he found employment
in a number of other stores, dabbled in ANC politics, observed
the 1946 mineworkers strike and finally in 1947 returned to
Sekhukhuneland. His wish to marry an educated Christian women was
rejected by his family and he entered into an arranged marriage
with a cousin whom he immediately despatched to school.(21)
Trading in Sekhukhuneland in the late 1940s was monopolised by a
handful of white trading families. The strict enforcment of a 3 0
mile exclusion zone made it extremely difficult for new traders
to gain licenses. But Mabowe was able to use his connections to
the Paramountcy and to Aapie Roux, to secure locations and li-
censes for stores. In the early 1950s as the Nationalist admin-
stration lowered the obstacles to black traders, Mabowe steadily
expanded the number of shops under his control. He also developed
close relations with a number of wholesalers based in Pietersburg
and forged links with the family of Dr Naude, HP for the town and
Minister of the Interior who was impressed by this shrewd and
convivial Pedi royal.(22)
Mabowe believed that it was pointless to resist the Nationalist
Government and judged that both Bantu Authorities and Bantu
Education would open up new avenues of opportunity and 'progress'
within the reserves. He acted as a key link between the NAD
officials based in Pietersburg and Morwamotshe and his council-
lors. Morwamotshe's closest advisors came to share Mabowe's view
that the Paramountcy could derive considerable benefits from co-
operating with the proposed new dispensation. Mabowe also had
close connections with other emergent black traders who also saw
potential advantages in the proposed new order. In the early
1950s after he was appointed by Morwamotshe as Chairmen of the
Sekhukhuneland School Board, he threw himself into the task of
refashioning local schooling. One of the obstacles to the expan-
sion of schooling had long been popular hostilty to missionary
dominance. Mabowe saw Bantu Education as an opportunity to build
conununitiy based and supported schools. When the only secondary
school in the area was closed by the Anglican Church Mabowe set
about collecting a 'voluntary' contribution of ten shillings from
each family in the location to build a brand new high school. He
was also able to fashion a happy combination of his interests
when he secured a trading licence for a prime spot adjacent to
the new school.(23)
Mabowe was the most articulate and visible spokesman for a small
minority within the reserve who supported Bantu Authorities.
Aside from traders, this grouping included some senior royals and
chiefs who were persuaded that the system would entrench and
improve their positions. Some headmen also resented their posi-
tions in the old order and hoped for better out of the new. As
Frans Marodi Nchabeleng complained in 1953, 'headmen have ren-
dered long and good service and have many followers but they are
still called headmen and they are not recognised by the govern-
ment' (24) There were also clerks, policemen and agricultural
rangers, whose fortunes were closely tied to those of the local
state. There was some division in the ranks of local teachers but
most came from conservative Christian backgrounds and were remote
from the main currents of popular concern. While uneasy about the
implications of Nationalist policies, they nonetheless tended
like Mabowe to view resistance as hopeless and to believe that
on balance state intervention would bring 'progress'. The broad
pattern was that those whose life strategies revolved around
migrancy and accumulating land and stock, rejected Bantu Author-
ities while those who were well placed to perceive opportuni-
ties in commerce, education and the local state took a rather
more sanguine view. As Gad Sekhukhune observed 'You know as a
businessman or as a teacher you have got to visualise the coming
land, they are a bit civilised unlike tribal people'.(25) But for
many people the new order represented not civilization but its
reverse - a quantum advance of the world of the whites, the
values of majakane and the stormtroopers of 'the Trust'.
By no means all senior royals supported Bantu Authorities. Some
believed that the new system would hamstring them politically and
materially, while others feared for the popular legitimacy of the
of the Paramountcy. Aware of high levels of popular hostility and
the existence of divisons amongst the bakgomane Bantu Affairs
Department(BAD) officials and Mabowe moved cautiously. A range
of inducements were held out to persuade Morwamotshe to estab-
lish a Tribal Authority. In 1953 on the death of Chief M. Kgolo-
ko, who had officially held sway over the southern portion of
Geluks location, the BAD offered to recognise Morwamotshe as
official Paramount on 'the understanding that within three months
[he] will agree to the establishment of a Bantu Authority, if
necessary with the powers of a regional authority'.(26) On the 20
August 1953, with considerable fanfare before an audience of
chiefs, headmen and officials , Morwamotshe was installed as
Paramount over the whole of Geluks location and the tribal
farms. Three months passed but no reguest to establish a Bantu
Authority was forthcoming. Thus began a cat-and-mouse game that
was to drag on for the next two years. In private meetings Morwa-
motshe and his most senior councillors gave their assurances that
they intended to comply, but in public meetings they deferred to
angry and even bellicose popular sentiment and avoided any open
commitment.
There were men of high rank who spoke out against Bantu Authori-
ties in these meetings. For example Godfrey Sekhukhune - a
staunch member of the ANC - argued that incorporation into these
structures would defile the legacy of Sekhukhune 1 and sever the
arteries of legitimacy and popular support for the Paramountcy.
He likened Bantu Authorities to a snake's egg that would hatch a
viper in the heart of the polity. Increasingly exasperated offi-
cials alternated between threats and promises. The Paramount was
reminded of the possibility of deposition. He was also offered
additional powers, a larger salary and finally on 10 December of
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1956 at a public meeting in a frenzy of bribery he was prom-
ised 'a railway bus, a secondary school, a clinic, a post office
and a telephone.'(27) When Horwamotshe agreed that he would like
these facilities Mr Prinsloo - the Chief Information Officer of
the BAD - leapt up and shook him by the hand. An official photo-
graph was taken and Mr Prinsloo announced that he was overjoyed
that Morwamotshe had accepted Bantu Authorities. Delighted BAD
officials began to prepare the proclamation of a regional author-
ity with councillors nominated by the Paramount and drawn from
the Maroteng bakgomana, the more powerful headmen and a couple
of teachers and shopkeepers.(28)
Sebatakgomo and the Khudhuthamaga
News of these events was carried to the Rand by migrant workers.
From the early 1950s workers from Sekhukhuneland gathered in
compounds, hostels, factories and burial societies to debate and
dissect events at home. They listened to the grim stories mi-
grants from other areas had to tell about 'the Trust' and Bantu
Authorities. As has been discussed at length in previous arti-
cles, Sebatakgomo - a rural resistance organisation set up in
1955 from within the ANC and the underground SACP - drew in these
networks of concerned migrants and developed a mass following
amongst mainly Pedi workers. It centred on the hostels and was
composed of village based committees which met in each of the
industrial centres and which sent representatives to a central
committee which met in Johannesburg. The central committee was
known as the Khudhuthamaga.(29)
The common denominator of the vast majority of the members of
Sebatakgomo was that they were migrant workers from baditshaba
communities in Sekhukhuneland. This provided a core of common
values and shared experiences of processes of rural and urban
change in the early 1950s. However there was also considerable
diversity in the movement which can be conceptualised by means
of a continuum. At one end of the continuum were individuals
with at least primary schooling, who had long histories of in-
volvement in unions, the SACP and ANC, and who were familiar with
the versions of democracy, nationalism and socialism propagated
in these organisations. A number of these men played a key role
in the leadership. At the other end of the continuum were mi-
grants who had neither western education nor involvement in
unions or political parties whose primary commitment was to
defending a residual rural autonomy. The latter, who probably
comprised the majority of the membership, had models of organisa-
tion derived primarily from their experience of the political
processes within chiefdoms, regiments and burial societies. Some
of these men were aware that many of the leaders of Sebatakgomo
had wider political connections, but trusted them because they
were from BoPedi. When the leadership visited rural communities
they stressed that they were from Sebatakgomo rather than empha-
sising their connections to the ANC. As the movement grew in
strength its 'Pedi' character became even more marked. In 1957
partly as a consequence of this shift its name was changed to
Fetakgomo which was derived from the political maxim Feta kgomo o
sware rootho - ( leave the cattle and take the people) - which was
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closely associated with the history of hegemony of the Maroteng
Paramountcy. It also had rather more immediate resonances given
the centrality of cattle culling to 'the Trust'.(30)
The use of the term Fetakgomo with its interplay of historical
and contemporary allusions highlights part of the reasons for the
organisations' success. Out of the interaction of its various
components an ideology was forged focussing on key symbols with
wide ranging resonances . Central to this ideology was a rejec-
tion of Bantu Authorities and 'the Trust'. This appealed to
concerns both over the Nationalists denial of political rights
to Africans within a common society, and to fears that the 'fre-
edom of the chiefdoms' would finally be destroyed. Defence of
chieftainship was a crucial component in the aims of Fetakgomo
but it was couched in terms which appealed to broadly based
consituencies. While the office of chieftainship - and especially
that of the Paramount - was celebrated, it was also recognised
that individual chiefs were incompetent and/or careless of their
subjects' interests.The ideal that kgoshi ke kgoshi ka batho was
stressed which resonanted both with commoner conerns over the
increasingly authoritarian anico-opted realities of chiefly rule
and with the democratic discourse of the ANC. (31)
In 1956 and 1957 Fetakgomo set about bringing these ideals and
the practice of chieftainship into closer alignment. As incon-
clusive meeting followed inconclusive meeting in Sekhukhuneland
fears grew amongst migrants that elements within the Paramountcy
were intent on doing a deal with the BAD. In November 1956
messages reached the Rand that Morwamotshe was about to capitu-
late. The leadership of Sebatakgomo despatched a letter from
'Sechaba sa Bapedi'(the Pedi community/nation) asking Morwamotshe
to convene a pitso at Mohlalatse which would be attended by
migrants and locals to discuss the issue. The letter was however
intercepted and ended up in the hands of the Native Commissioner.
When the migrants led by John Kgoana Nkadimeng arrived on the
appointed day they found the police waiting for them with an
order prohibiting the meeting. The large and angry crowd which
had gathered was finally forced to disperse. But Morwamotshe was
clearly shaken by these events. Before the migrants returned to
Johannesburg he told Nkadimeng, 'You go back and tell my people
that I have not signed for the land [accepted Bantu
Authorities](32)
The Sunday after their return from Sekhukhuneland a meeting of
Sebatakgomo was called. It was reported that police had prevented
the pitso and it was argued that the organisation was of little
value if it could be so easily thwarted by the authorities.
Nkadimeng suggested that in future Sebatakgomo should operate as
far as possible in secret. They should find secure means of
conveying messages and issue cards only to trusted members. But
it was also concluded that if the movement was to succeed steps
had to be taken against a more insidious enemy, 'that all persons
who proved to be renegades should be exposed and made known to
members of the organisation. Renegades were considered to be
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those working for the government or who are informers'.(33) The
fears of the migrants were intensified when news reached them
that Morwamotshe, within two weeks of giving them the assurance
that he would not 'sign', had apparently publicly embraced both
Mr Wessels and Bantu Authorities.
This turn of events persuaded the leadership of Sebatakgomo that
drastic measures were required. But they still sought to avoid a
head-on confrontation with Morwamotshe which could both have
sown division in their own ranks and tarnished a vital symbol.
It was proposed that Mabowe Sekhukune and others who formed the
Dihloqo Tsa Motse (literally the heads of the village) - the
inner circle of Morwamotshe's administration - should be deposed
and replaced by individuals who could be trusted by the migrants.
To this end, and after much debate, it was decided to send Phete-
di Thulare (a senior royal) and Morewane Motubatse to Moh] iletse
to take matters in hand. These individuals along with other mi-
grants who were at home started to contact influential villagers
amongst them Morwamoche's brother Mosehla Sekhukhune - and to
mobilise popular opposition to Mabowe, Motodi and the other
councillors. After some weeks, a series of meetings were held
at Mohlaletse at which the existing advisers of the Paramount
were called to account. They were accused of secret dealings with
officials, of withholding vital information and of misleading
Morwamotshe. In these and subsequent meetings the activities of
Mabowe Sekhukhune came under particular scrutiny. He failed to
attend but, in his absence, was charged - amongst other things -
with embezzling the funds for the new school and of misusing
the chiefs' car. But most importantly of all he was accused of
conspiring to usurp the chieftainship. A photograph of Mabowe
published in the December 1956 issue of the BAD magazine Bantu
and captioned 'Chief Sekhukhune' was seen conclusive proof of
the validity of these fears. Through all of these proceedings,
however, care was taken to avoid direct criticism of Morwa-
motshe. (34)
The upshot of these meetings was the replacement of the Para-
mounts' key advisers. Ntladi Mampuru was appointed as Induna and
Phetedi Thulare as secretary and a new inner council was con-
structed out of individuals who had a track record of opposition
to BAs. Mabowe - in the face of persistent rumours that an at-
tempt would be made on his life - left the area and his shops
were subject to an almost total popular boycott. Motodi and many
of the other displaced advisers, sought refuge in the neighbour-
ing village of Ntshabeleng. These events constituted a major
political coup. While on the face of it operating within the con-
ventions and forms of chiefly power, these meetings had in fact
overturned long-established practices which restricted influence
over these positions to a small group selected by the Paramount
and senior royals. Now a much broader constituency within the
chiefdom had been actively involved and the group installed in
key positions also maintained close contact with Sebatakgomo's
structures on the Rand. One of the principal projects pursued by
the new urban and rural leadership was to collect funds to pro-
vide Morwamotshe with a new house and car. This was in part in-
tended to remind Morwamotshe that material rewards for loyalty
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were not the monopoly of the BAD.(35)
Once again the BAD officials found their hopes dashed of the
smooth establishment of a Bantu Authority. Morwamotshe flanked
by his new advisers denied that he had ever accepted Bantu Au-
thorities. In mid March 1957 Dr Piet Koornhof was dispatched by
Eiselen to investigate the situation. He was alarmed by what he
found and argued that 'a setback.... will have repercussions
throughout the Transvaal because Sekhukhuneland can be regarded
as the heart of the Transvaal Bantu'. He recommended firm meas-
ures against the new advisers and continued support for Mabowe.
(36) Early in April, Phetedi Thulare and Godfrey Sekhukhune were
arrested and deported to Matubatuba and Mtunzini respectively.
After these arrests the Dihlogo Tsa Motse worked in close con-
junction with the urban leadership of Fetakgomo to stage pro-
tests and to raise money to retain lawyers to contest the depor-
tations. The urban leadership made a number of visits to Sekhuk-
huneland in these months. A recurring refrain in their meetings
was that it was 'time to win back the land but that they must now
fight not with assegaais but with money.'(37) They also reported
on the rapid growth and activities of Fetakgomo in the urban
areas and distributed membership cards.
The BAD response was two-pronged. On the one hand repression was
intensified. Over the following year there were further deporta-
tions, Morwamotshe was deprived of his official authority to hear
tribal cases, the school at Mohlaletse was closed, the ANC was
banned and an effective local state of emergency was declared. On
the other hand overtures were made to a number of headmen to
accept Bantu Authorities. The principal inducement that was
offered was that those who complied would be recognised as
independent chiefs and would head autonomous tribal authorities.
While most chiefs resisted these blandishments - not least of all
for fear of the wrath of their followers - a minority responded
positively.(38)
These developments heightened tensions within the chiefdoms. The
urban leadership of Fetakgomo urged that the organisation should
be expanded in the rural area but Morwamotshe and some members of
the Dihlogo Tsa Motse resisted on grounds that existing political
structures were adequate. A group of younger migrants - aged in
their twenties and early thirties - who were present at Mohla-
letse and who had participated in Fetakgomo activities in Jo-
hannesburg were not satisfied with this response. Led by Lebe-
like Mogase and Motubatse Mangope, they called a meeting of the
Dihlogo Tsa Motse. They demanded to be allowed to participate in
meetings of the council as one member recalled 'because they just
saw us drink beer while they paid money and the banned men still
had not returned. Therefore they wanted representation to put
matters right.'(39) Morwamotshe and some of the councillors re-
sisted repeated demands along these lines but eventually Kgetjepe
Makotenyane and Nkopodi Rampelani said that that 'they were our
children and would help us with the work and a majority agreed
to their involvement'(40) Once they were admitted the young mi-
grants urged that the name of the council should be changed to
Khudhuthamaga and that it should follow the political lead of
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its Johannesburg namesake - the executive committee of Fetakgo-
mo.
The intervention of the young migrants saw yet another shift in
the balance of power within the chiefdom. For now it was not only
commoners but also young men who had a decisive say in the inner
councils of the Paramountcy. Having secured unprecedented politi-
cal leverage, these men helped build the Khudhuthamaga into a
major political force in the region. Office bearers were elected
and regular meetings were held under a Marula tree on the moun-
tain slopes behind the royal kgoro. Branches were established
in the major villages which sent two elected representatives to
the central committee. Morwamotshe was not present except at
special request but was represented at meetings by his brother
Mosehla Sekhukhune. In practice the Khudhuthamaga became the
effective focus of power and authority on the vital issues of
the day.(41)
One of the most urgent issues it confronted was what to do in the
case of subordinate chiefs who might agree to the establishment
of tribal authorities. While some of these individuals were
rulers of long standing and were relatively well-entrenched most
were at loggerheads with the majority of their own villagers and
the fact that headmen who accepted Bantu Authorities were expect-
ed to make an immediate start on 'betterment' further eroded
their popular support. The strategy that was pursued in these
instances was that their subjects brought complaints against them
to Mohlaletse where - after a hearing - they were deposed and
replaced with individuals acceptable to. the Khudhuthamaga. A
number of headmen who suffered this fate appealed to local offi-
cials for support. The consequence in a handful of communities
was the existence of two competing headmen/or women: one with
minority support but with official recognition, the other sup-
ported by the Khudhuthamaga and by the majority of their vil-
lages. (42)
These events produced a profound polarisation within Sekhuk-
huneland between a small minority defined as supporters of Bantu
Authorities and dubbed Haranqera and the overwhelming majority
known as the Makhudhuthamaqa - the people of the khudhuthamaga.
The term Marangera was taken from the African agricultural
rangers who served under white agricultural officers on 'Trust'
farms. Rangers symbolised co-option by white officialdom and the
invasion and subversion of the inner domain of chiefdoms and
homesteads. All those who publicly proclaimed themselves in
favour of tribal authorities and /or betterment earned this
appellation. (43)
But the category also had rather broader connotations. It harked
back to the bitter and costly struggle between allies of Abel
Erasmus and the supporters of Sekhukhune II in the 1890s. It was
also coloured by the division between Christians and baditshaba.
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By no means all of the Rangers were Christians but many were from
majakane families and Christians had long been viewed as a poten-
tial fifth column within the society. Black teachers were also
closely associated in popular thinking both with Christianity and
more broadly with the intrusion of white power and values. The
fact that a number of teachers were prominent supporters of BAs
considerably strengthened these perceptions. There was also
considerable suspicion of black traders. Epitomised in the
person of Mabowe Sekhukhune such traders' were suspected of a
willingness to betray and subvert core values in order to be able
to secure their own material advantage. This perception was
probably heightened by the failure of most black, traders to play
the publicly redistributive roles that had helped legitimate
previous patterns of accumulation within chiefdoms. There was
also a widespread belief that the white officials' key informers
were to be found amongst the ranks of the Rangers and their was
a suspicion that some were using the powers of witchcraft to
defend and advance their cause. Rangers - in short - came to
symbolise not only Bantu Authorities and 'the Trust' but a whole
constellation of forces which threatened the ' freedom of the
chiefdoms'. (44) ,
In 1959 Motodi Nchabeleng - a teacher but nonetheless a staunch
supporter of the Khudhuthamaga - wrote a vivid account of these
divisions.
The Rangers were the spies of the system of Bantu Authori-
ties. Their work was to go around arresting people and reporting
those that spoke out against the system to the authorities....
Another word that caused fear was St Helena [deportation]. It
came to the point that the ... the Rangers refused to eat with
the resisters and ... the people resolved no longer to accept
food from the hands of the Rangers. Paying each other visits was
now fraught with danger ... Fear of killing grew in the country
of Bopedi. In the night people walked in fear of one another.
The Rangers were always heard saying of the resisters, 'this year
they will go for ever.' Then it was often heard that so and so
was picked up and sent to St Helena. Mockery and talking ill of
one another grew night and day. As time went by it became evident
that here in BoPedi would be no peace or reconciliation.(45)
This account highlights not only the depth of the divisions, but
also conveys a sense of the role that witchcraft beliefs played
in deepening polarisation. Belief in witchcraft was pervasive
in both Christian and Baditshaba communities in the 1950s and the
use of poisons was regarded as the hall mark of the particularly
feared category of day witches. As Motodi Nchabeleng recalled
'they thought witches were poisoning people, mostly those who
were strong speakers' (against BAs].(46) The power to inflict
disaster on ones enemies was another element in the armoury of
witches which also appeared to some to be mirrored in the ability
of Rangers to secure the deportation of their opponents. Witch-
craft and misfortune were in addition believed to flourish in
divided communities. This is not - of course - to suggest that
there was a simple elision of witches and Rangers but rather that
forms of explanations which underpinned witchcraft beliefs shaded
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into the interpretation of these divisions and coloured the
characterisation of Rangers.(47)
Feelings ran so high on these natters that the threat of violence
was present in many meetings where Rangers faced their detrac-
tors. The experience of 72- year-old 'Ginger' Kambula at a
meeting at Mohlaletse in September 1957 provides a vivid picture
of one such encounter. Kambula, who was from a far-flung chiefdom
but related to Morwamotshe by marriage had not attended a meeting
at the Paramountcy for some time and was not aware of how dan-
gerous the political undercurrents there had become. After having
taken notes of the meeting on a piece of paper he rose to argue
that the Paramountcy would be destroyed if Bantu Authorities were
rejected. The Chairman of the meeting Kgagudi Maredi leapt to his
feet and shouted 'take that paper on which he has been writing
and tear it to pieces because he wants to give it to Mabowe. He
is a Ranger.'(48) Then a group of men stormed down on him and
beat him until Morwamotshe and Mosehla Sekhukhune were able to
stop them.
As the state intensified pressures in Sekhukhuneland and succeed-
ed in widening cleavages in the body politic, debates took an
ominous new turn. Late in 1957 some of the younger . migrants
started to relay accounts of events at Zeerust and elsewhere
where 'collaborators' houses had been burnt and some had been
killed. It was argued in a meeting of the Khudhuthamaga with
Morwamotshe present that 'it no longer is possible to live along-
side people who caused our people to be arrested. They should be
killed.' Morwamotshe responded 'If you want to practice withcraft
do it without my agreement. Why do you ask my permission to kill
people?' He went on to say that he wanted no violence and the
Khudhuthamaga as a whole supported him.(49)
By March 1958 it had become obvious to the BAD that neither
threat nor promise could prize Morwamotshe free of his new coun-
cillors. Officials decided on drastic measures. Morwamotshe was
suspended from office and 82-year-old Kgobalala Sekhukhune who
was a retired policeman remote from the main line of succession
was appointed in his stead. On the 21st March Morwamotshe was
deported to Cala in the Transkei accompanied by his wife and
children. The BAD believed that they had provided a salutary
display of their power. What they failed to understand initially
was that by acting directly against Morwamotshe they had deliv-
ered the most profound affront imaginable to popular political
values. The shock waves of the officials' ham-fisted action
reverberated through the villages, compounds and hostels. In
Johannesburg John Nkadimeng addressed a mass meeting. "I asked
them, how can they be proud any more when their king has been
taken away and they sit here with other people? What do they
tell them, what do they say about their own life?'(50) These
words also convey a sense of the importance of the Paramountcy
for migrant's own sense of identity.
Morwamotshe's deportation came only two weeks' after he had
spoken out against the use of violence against Rangers. When the
Khudhuthamaga assembled in early April in the aftermath of his
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•>^rest, it was more receptive to militant voices. Mosehla Sek-
;ikhune was the acting head. Stephen Zelwane Nkadimeng made an
impassioned speech. He proclaimed that the Rangers were the cause
of Morwamotshe's arrest and that they should be Killed. He said
that at the last meeting people warned that the Chief might get
involved if they fought with the Rangers. The chief had now been
captured. Now was the time to kill the Rangers. A heated argument
broke out in the meeting. Some shouted out that now was the time
to kill them, while others argued that large amounts of money
had been gathered to pay for lawyers which would be wasted if
people took matters into their own hands. While a majority of the
meeting remained reluctant, a vocal minority of younger men per-
sisted in their demand for direct action. Finally, Mosehla Sek-
hukhune agreed that the Rangers should be killed because it was
they who were responsible for the arrest of the Paramount. There-
after individuals called out the names of individuals considered
to be Rangers and lists of intended victims were compiled.(51)
In the weeks that followed discussions "continued amongst the
group of younger men who described themselves as ' the soldiers
of the Khudhuthamaga.'(52) A plan was drawn up to attack Rang-
ers simultaneously throughout the region on a set day. This
action was to be executed by the 'youth'. Fears were expressed,
however, that violence would widen and deepen cleavages within
the villages, leaving the relatives of those killed embittered
and intent on revenge. Such an outcome would have defeated a
central part of the purpose of the planned attacks on the Rangers
which were seen as a means of overcoming internal disunity,
restoring community cohesion, and thus of strengthening defences
against both misfortune and external intervention. In an attempt
to combat the potential for division, relatives of the intended
victims were urged to lead the attacks.(53)
On the 13 May men from the Reef and the reserve massed at the
Native Commissioners' office at Schoonoord to demand the return
of the Paramount. Kgobolala - the acting chief - and Mosehla
had a meeting with the Commissioner during which Kgobolala
pleaded, unsuccessfully, to be allowed to stand down. The Com-
missioner then went out to speak to the crowd. He greeted them by
saying 'Paramount Chief Kgobolala and the Bapedis' and then went
on amidst mounting uproar to tell the assembly that Morwamotshe
would never be allowed to return. Members of the crowd shouted
out 'you are just here to collect our taxes not to appoint our
chiefs. We will break down this building because it was built
with our money, we will no longer pay taxes, and the police must
no longer visit our villages'.(54) Thereafter the crowd moved
off to a nearby clump of Marula trees. What happened then is
shrouded in controversy. State witnesses later maintained that
Mosehla and others made speeches giving explicit orders that
'Rangers should be killed' but notwithstanding the generalised
outrage at what had transpired it is improbable that they would
so publicly have thrown all caution to the winds. More persuasive
are the accounts that suggest that speakers laid the blame for
this turn of events on the Rangers and that there were calls from
within the crowd that 'the Rangers are known in every village
and that they must be named and be kicked out of the villages.
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Others shouted out that they should be killed.'(55)
It was three days later (on 16 May) that Kgobolala was so
rudely awakened as described in the introduction. Another
prominent Ranger at Mohlaletse, Thomas Mothabong Mabogoane, was
also roused by a knock on his door before sunrise. He recalled
I heard voices outside the door and when I opened it I saw
Motubatse. I said 'whats wrong'? He then spoke in a soft voice
so that I could not hear him. Then I realised what the whole
village knows - they have come to kill me. I stepped outside and
he stabbed me.(56)
Mabogoane, though seriously wounded, managed to flee and both he
and Kgobolala escaped with their lives. The fact that they sur-
vived, though heavily outnumbered, suggests that their attackers
still lacked the resolve to murder. The assault was not only
half-hearted, it was half-cocked as well for the attacks at
Mohlaletse took place in advance of the date set by the 'sol-
diers of the Khudhuthamaga' for the eradication of the Rangers.
Later on the same morning police went to the village of Manganeng
to arrest two of the more militant speakers at the schoonoord
meeting - Phaswane Nkadimeng who was heir ;to the office of
local headman, and Stephan Zelwane Nkadimeng. The crowd that
gathered blocked the police cars exit route. The policemen pa-
nicked, opened fire and killed a man and a pregnant women and
wounded several others before driving of at high speed with their
captives. This episode snapped the final restraints and Rangers
were attacked firstly in Manganeng and then throughout Sekhuk-
huneland.(57)
When news of the shooting reached Mohlaletse early the next day
two regiments were mobilised to go to the assistance of the
people at Manganeng but dispersed when they encountered a heavily
armed police column. Palane Matjie recently returned from an
abortive attempt to find and kill Mabowe Sekhukhune when he
joined the men en route to Manganeng. After the regimensts colli-
sion with the 'Boers' and now accompanied by Dihlare Masufi, he
resumed the search for the second man on his list of targets
Dinakanyane Seroka - who was widely believed to be using with-
craft to assist the Rangers. Eventually they found him hiding in
a donga.
We said to him 'where are you from and where are you going?'
He did not answer. Dihlare said to me 'Now what do we do with
him?' I said 'he is our enemy we cannot just leave him, you are
wasting time'. I hit him with a knobkierie on his head then Dih-
lare stabbed him with a spear. It broke when it went into
him....he managed to pull it out.... Then I stabbed him. I stab-
bed him. I finished him off.
After they had killed him, they took his pass book which they
delivered to the moshate (chiefs place) saying ' you don't have
to worry any longer we have killed him.'(58)
The next day, despite numerous warnings, the leading Ranger
Chief Kgolane Kgoloko went back to his village of Madibong along
with his induna Hakoropetje Maphiri. When they arrived a crowd
of sixty people - mainly men with assegais and axes but also some
women with stones - stormed down upon them. They fled in sepa-
rate directions. The chief took refuge in a house but was pulled
out and beaten and stabbed to death. A millstone was placed on
his battered head. Mhaphiri was also cornered and killed.(59)
Despite the spontaneous elements in the violence, the idea that
its socially corrosive effects could be contained, still seems
to have played some part in shaping the pattern of events. At the
village of Mphanama, Mangase Mashabela was identified as a
Ranger, was seized by an angry mob and was taken to be executed.
His life was spared, however, when four of his sons in turn
refused to strike the first blow.(60) At Hanganeng after the
police shooting the enraged crowd surrounded the house of
trader Motle Nkadimeng. It was led by a relative Maseboto Ga-
natse . When he entered the house he encountered his intended
victims daughter Moseane. She said 'is it you?' He replied 'yes
it is I little niece'. She said 'is it really you that has come
to kill my father?' He replied 'yes but if I kill you father you
will not struggle or go wanting'. She begged to be allowed to
stay with her father in his final moments but she was driven away
before he was killed.(61)
By the 18 May nine men had been killed, many more had been in-
jured and the property of Rangers had been put to the torch.
Some of the victims were publicly proclaimed supporters of Bantu
Authorities, but others -including traders and teachers - were
attacked partly because they fell into the social categories
which were associated with the Rangers. But attacks were also
quite specific. As the above cases indicate, while anger was
vented on particular individuals, their families by and large
escaped without serious physical injury. Once this wave of kill-
ings was over a war of attrition followed. Police swarmed over
Sekhukhuneland and many villagers took refuge in the mountains.
There were further attacks - especially hut burnings- on Rangers,
a widespread refusal to pay taxes and an intensified boycott of
Ranger traders. Over three hundred men and women were arrested
and trials on charges ranging from public violence to murder
continued over the next two years. But officials also realised
both that they had blundered by deporting Morwamotshe and that
little progress could be made until he was returned. After offi-
cials received private assurances that he would be more co-opera-
tive in future Morwamotshe was returned home in August 1958. His
arrival was greeted with jubilation and was seen as a great
victory by the majority of his subjects.(62)
Explaining the violence 7. ' I
The preceding narrative contains elements of an explanation for
the incidence and form of the violence. It grew out of a context
of intensifying state intervention and repression in which core
values of the society were placed under^ threat. Many people
believed that their whole way of life faced destruction. The
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targets of the violence - the Rangers - were initially seen as
agents of a malevolent enemy but as the conflict intensified they
were increasingly believed to bear prime responsibility for the
dangers that confronted the society. This depiction of their
role was coloured by witchcraft beliefs, and the view gained
ground that it was only by the removal of the 'enemy within '
and the restoration of a cohesive community that disaster could
be averted. The arrest and deportation of the Paramount consti-
tuted the most profound affront imaginable to the social order
which the makhudhuthamaqa sought to defend and proved to be a
trigger for violence. But the shootings by the police at
Manganeng helped to inject a more spontaneous and lethal element
into the attacks.
But the question remains of why it was that Rangers were increas-
ingly represented as having primary responsibilty for arrests and
deportations? It was after all very visibly white officials and
police who were the key actors and few migrants or residents were
under any misapprehensions about the relative power of the South
African state. One part of an explanation is the widespread
belief that, behind the scenes, Mabowe Sekhukhune and his allies
were providing information to, and manipulating, officials in
order to advance their own political ambitions. This interpreta-
tions was also consisistent with deep seated models of causation
which tended to place internal divisions and conflicts at the
forefront of explanantions for profound set backs such as - for
example - the conquest of the polity by the Ndwandwe in the 1820s
and by the British in the 1870s. A further element in an explana-
tion is the 'dual theory' of causation commonly contained within
witchcraft beliefs which sets out to explain the particularity of
misfortune. Among the Azande, to cite a- classic example, the
question was posed as to 'why particular warriors, and not
others are killed by particular enemies in battle. Clearly those
slain were killed by enemy spears; but an internal enemy, the
witch, has caused this particular death'.(63) It seems plausible,
in a context in which witchcraft accusations were rife, that the
particularity of the misfortunes of arrest and deportation where
partly explained by the witchcraft believed to be practised by
the Rangers.
Another element of an explanation is highlighted by the mobili-
sation of the regiments at Mohlaletse and by the centrality of
the young 'soldiers of the Khudhuthamaga'. The Pedi kingdom had
been defeated, disarmed and partially dismantled. But a military
capacity and ethos had by no means been entirely extinguished.
Accounts of the wars fought against the British and the Boers
were told and retold and the role of internal divisions in
providing fatal chinks in the defensive armour of the state was
recalled. The reality of defeat and control was acknowledged but
the legitimacy of the new rulers and especially their right to
the land was far from fully recognised. Within the villages the
socialisation of young men continued to hold up the ideal of the
fearless warrior. Boys' principal form of recreation was stick
fighting and young men learned to use rather more lethal assegais
and battle axes. In towns some participated in the 'bruising
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comradeship' of the amalaita. During initiation youths' physical
courage was repeatedly put to the test, they were steeped in
military history and ultimately formed into regiments. One of the
tasks entrusted to these regiments remained the defence of the
community.(64)
Despite this schooling of young men in the military arts, Sek-
hukhuneland for much of the first half of the twentieth century
was relatively free of serious violence. That was part of what
differentiated it from the despised urban wilderness. But the
young migrant 'soldiers of the Khudhuthamaga' had also had to
learn to survive in the often violent worlds of the compound, the
hostel, the location and, increasingly in the 1950s, the pris-
on. (65) They were, in varying degree , exposed to the more mili-
tant mass based politics of the period and became aware through
discussions with migrants from other districts of violent resist-
ance elsewhere to state attempts at rural restructuring. Armed
with these experiences the 'young men' were prepared to challenge
the more cautious approach of many of the older generation in
the villages. This does not of course mean that these men
relished violence or that murder came easily to them. Indeed the
botched attempts on both Kgobolala and Mabogoane suggest that the
young men involved were also partially paralysed by the sickening
disjuncture that novices find between the theory and practice of
war. But what is also true is that young men steeped in this
culture and convinced that their communities faced, mortal dangers
did not have to wrestle with the Ghandian or Christian pacifism
and /or a commitment to nonviolent action that inhibited some the
leadership of the ANC when they pondered the choices open to
them.(66)
Explanations which focus on the socialisation of young men,
however do not explain the role that women played in the vio-
lence. At Madibong, for example, women played a leading role in
the resistance to and ultimately the murder of Chief Kgolane
Kgoloko. Two women, Madinoge Pholokwe and Mapeetla Raseomane were
subseqently sentenced to death for their part in these events.
Madinoge was the senior wife of Chief Morwamotshe Kgoloko and she
was two months pregnant when he died in 1953. Kgolane Kgoloko
was appointed as regent on. his brother's death and was entrusted
with responsibilty for Madinoge and the infant heir. He and
Madinoge rapidly came into conflict, however, and she rejected
his authority and established an alternative relationship with
John Makopole Kgolane. When Kgolane indicated his support for
BAs and started erecting fences, Madinoge emerged as the leader
of the mounting popular hostility to his rule. The matter was
taken to Mohlaletse and Kgolane was deposed and Madinoge was
appointed as regent in his place. Kgolane did not accept this
verdict and to the fury of his subjects continued to rule with
the support of the Native Commissioner. When Kgolane returned to
Madibong on that fateful day in May of 1958 it was believed that
during his absence he had conspired with white officials to have
Madinoge and her key supporters 'thrown away to St Helena'(de-
ported) . The available evidence points to Madinoge as the effec-
tive leader of the opposition to Kgolane but both in the pre-
liminary hearings and in the Supreme Court trial that followed,
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the male oficers of the court could not bring themselves to
accept that a woman could have been the leader and it was her
hapless lover, John Kgolane, who was portrayed rather as the
villain of the piece.(67)
The story of Madinoge provides an example of the kind of role
that the senior wives of chiefs could and did play in dynastic
struggles, but as chief wife and potential regent she was hardly
representative of women in general. However, in other villages,
while women played a less prominent part in leadership, in as-
saults and in killings, they were at the forefront the destruc-
tion of fences and other manifestations of 'the Trust'. And
there is also evidence of women challenging men to take action.
In 1954 at the village of Mafefe, Naphtali Lebopo was working
with two other rangers demarcating fields, when suddenly a woman
appeared and shouted 'Men you better bring me those trousers, we
will wear them because you are cowards.'(68) Then men appeared,
somewhat sheepishly, holding assegais. The rangers' truck was
close at hand and they scrambled into it and sped off.
There were very few female migrant workers from Sekhukhuneland
on the Rand in the 1940s and 1950s and those that were in the
towns were not represented in the urban structures of Sebatakgo-
mo. Women were also excluded from the central political forums
within the chiefdoms and did not participate in the meetings of
the Khudhuthamaga. But this exclusion did not exempt them from
particitpating in the wider polarization of communities or pre-
vent them from contributing to the growing conviction that
Rangers should be removed from the villages. This was not simply
a case of wives being swayed by the interests of their husbands.
In the context of a migrant labour based economy in which remit-
tances were often sporadic and sometimes ceased alltogether, many
women were crucially dependant on access to land and cattle for
their survival and for that of their families. While formal
control over both was vested in the hands of their husbands and
brothers de facto management of these resources by the 1940s and
1950s ha3~ In iome instances devolved on women. 'The Trust'
threatened to diminish or even to deny the access of many fami-
lies to these vital props to their livelihood and also introduced
a definition of rights to land and cattle in which only mens'
rights to control these resources was fully recognised. Widows
and more broadly female heads of households were anomalies in the
minds of agricultural officials and were considered - at best
to have diminished claims to land and livestock. They were
therefore faced with being forced into still more dependent
relations on male kin or even with outright dispossession. It is
hardly suprising that women were numbered amongst the most mili-
tant opponents of 'the Trust'.(69)
Violence and the ANC
While the use of violence ran directly counter to the official
policy of the ANC and SACP, there were undercurrents of discus-
sion within both movements which may have contributed to these
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events and which were certainly affected by the Sekhukhueland
Revolt. In the aftermath of the 1952 defiance campaign there was
considerable debate about the viability of passive resistance
and while it was eventually accepted as continuing to be appro-
priate for the meanwhile, some members including migrant workers
from Sekhukhuneland like Flag Boshielo and John Kgoana Nkadimeng,
believed in the idea of fighting back. Now the guestion was
if you fight back how would you do it. So people like Flag analy-
sed this question especially after 1953 now with the Mau Mau
revolt everybody was talking about it. And we had discussion
groups where we were talking about this guerrilla war, you know.
We really cherished the idea that one day we would be able to
fight back.(70)
Flag Boshielo - a prominent member of both the underground SACP
and the ANC and the original driving force behind Sebatakgomo -
was particularly taken up with this issue and devoured all the
material he could find on Mau Mau. In the early 1950s he went to
Sekhukhuneland to train as a herbalist and to explore the possi-
bilities of rural guerrilla warfare. On his return he argued
still more strongly for serious consideration to be given to
armed struggle. One important context in which he expressed his
views was that of the grouping of migrant workers from Sekhuk-
huneland who formed the inner circle of the leadership of Seba-
takgomo. Boshielo was banned in 1955 and restricted to Jo-
hannesburg but remained an influential figure.(71) The evidence
presently available does not make it possible to establish con-
clusively what influence - if any - these views had on the think-
ing of the 'soldiers of the Khudhuthamaga.' But it is suggestive
that Stephen Zelwane Nkadimeng who led the demand for violence
against the Rangers within the Khudhuthamaga, was also a member
of the ANC and the SACP and was probably well versed in these
early debates about armed struggle.
Whether or not they were influenced by discussions within the
ANC and the Party, these events certainly played a part in fuell-
ing the debate about armed struggle within sections of the na-
tional movements. The willingness of communities to take up
arms, the fact that the mountains and caves of Sekhukhuneland had
once again given rebels shelter and that the state had been
forced to return the Paramount, all gave food for thought to men
from Sekhukhuneland like Boshielo, Nkadimeng, John Phala and
Elias Motsoaledi who were ultimately to play significant roles
in Umkhonto We Sizwe. The Revolt also provided Boshielo with
additional ammunition in his campaign to put armed struggle on
the political agenda. The question may have cropped up in the
regular discussions he held with Mandela and Mick Harmel. The
law firm of Tambo and Mandela played an important part along
with Shulemoth Muller in challenging the deportations and orga-
nising the defence of the rebels. And the ANC and SACP leader-
ship, embroiled in the interminable Treason Trial, had ample
opportunity to reflect on the significance of these events. Not
least of all they were confronted by requests from militants
from Sekhukhuneland and subsequently from Pondoland for guns in
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order to be able to pursue their struggles more effectively. And
while they were not yet able to meet that demand, they did put
emissaries from Pondoland, whose own struggles were just begin-
ning into contact with veterans of the 1958 Revolt.(72)
One must be careful, of course, not to overstate the role of
either Boshielo or the Sekhukhuneland Revolt in the shift to
armed struggle. Clearly both are no more than pieces in a very
much larger puzzle.(73) But this evidence does provide some
context for Mandela's acknowledgement of the role played by the
rural revolts in prompting this shift and it also helps explain
why Elias Motsoaledi when asked in 1993 to describe the forma-
tion of MK began his account with the battle against 'the Trust'
in the northen Transvaal. For him, at least, the Sekhukhuneland
Revolt was the opening skirmish in the war of liberation.(74)
Certainly once MK was formed the urban and rural networks of
Sebatakgomo provided a rich source of recruits. Godfrey Sekhuk-
hune back in Sekhukhuneland after his banishment to Natal became
the key contact and recruiter for MK. John Phala recalls of the
early days
Organising the volunteers to go to MK it was simple and easy
because Sebatakgomo was strong.... In the Sekhukhune area we
would just call the people [in the village] in a mass meeting and
say " The ANC wants soldiers, the ANC wants soldiers." Then
everybody was rushing to call his or her son to come and join
MK. Here in the [Jane Furse] hospital was the headquarters of
recruiting for the ANC. Godfrey Sekhukhune was a male nurse in
this hospital. So when we organise the volunteers to join MK we
used the ambulance. So Motsoaledi was coming to collect people
here at the hospital because they have been collected in an
ambulance from all over our villages.(75)
Just what the somewhat staid collection of doctors at the
hospital in 1962 would have said if Iney had discovered the
purpose to which their ambulance service was being put beggars
the imagination!
Conclusion
Policemen and prosecutors were right to suggest that the
Khudhuthamaga played a significant part in the Sekhukhuneland
Revolt. But the picture of a sinister conspiracy bent on violence
which they painted in the courts in an attempt to secure the
conviction and execution of its members, obscures as much as it
reveals. As we have seen the organisation emerged out of popular
concern - especially among migrant workers - that chieftainship
would become an instrument of Bantu Authorities and the hated
'Trust'. It was part of a remarkable attempt to make real the
ideal that Kgoshi ke kgoshi ka batho which resonated both with
the democratic values articulated within the ANC and with common-
er conceptions of chieftainship. Sebatakgomo and the Khudhuthama-
ga were able to mobilise a very broad following and to effect
significant changes in the nature of chiefly rule partly because
of a strategy and ideology which celebrated chieftainship - espe-
cially the paramountcy - at the same time as it set about trans-
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forming it. But it is also important to recall that the attempt
to democratise the institution never challenged a second funda-
mental proposition which was 'Kqoshi ke kqoshi ka madi ke bok-
goshi'(A chief is a chief by the blood of a chief) which stressed
its hereditary basis. And the exclusion of women and uninitiated
men from key political forums and processes went unquestioned.
Equally while the Khudhuthamaga mustered widespread popular
support and participation it was also a forum in which dissent
was viewed with mounting hostility and in which the eradication
of cleavages within the community became an overriding value.
The perception of individuals stigmatised as Rangers evolved from
one which portrayed them as agents of the system to one in which
they bore primary responsibility for its actions. They were first
shouted down, then driven from the villages and finally assaulted
and even killed. These were extreme circumstances in which commu-
nities faced a fundamental assault from state structures which
commanded very little legitimacy and provided almost no meaning-
ful channels for the representation of popular sentiment. None-
theless it must also be said that the popular political culture
which evolved in this bleak environment, in which division,
dissent and disaster were seen as intimately interconnected, in
turn constituted stony ground for the nurture a culture of
debate and tolerance of divergence. The political legacy of the
Khudhuthamaga is, in short, ambiguous. It contains elements which
could well feed into contemporary attempts to construct a demo-
cratic rural order. It also displays symptoms of the political
intolerance and witch burnings which disfigured the fleeting
dominance of the 'comrades^ in Sekhukhuneland in the 1980s. But
it should also be borne in mind that the young ' soldiers of the
Khudhuthamaga' and the even younger 'comrades' of the later
period saw themselves as being at war and war has rarely been
democracy's friend.(75)
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